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MEDICAL TORT LAW: THE EMERGENCE OF A




Medical tort law is a battlefield of social evolution. The conduct
of professionals, perhaps more than any other segment of society, re-
flects changes in societal standards. Tort law, which establishes the
lower limits of professional standards of conduct, must stay abreast of a
society that is becoming increasingly more professional and specialized.
Anyone who has "been to the doctor" knows that medicine has
become a highly specialized profession. Has tort law, as it applies to
the medical profession, lagged behind the degree to which medicine
has progressed? Has tort law permitted standards of medical conduct
to be substandard? Does the standard of care really reflect the manner
in which medicine has been standardized in the various specialties?
Does relatively static tort law, in contrast to the well-financed dynamics
of medical progress, cause patients to suffer an increasing gap between
legal standards of medical conduct and medical standards of modem
medicine?
This article examines the standard of conduct which must be met
by medical professionals. In doing so, the history of the "locality" rule
and its expansion, the "same or similar communities" rule, will be
traced and commented upon. This article will focus on the emerging
"specialty standard of care" rule, urging its adoption nationwide and
will conclude by commenting on the ramifications of such a national
standard's adoption. Medical tort law ensures minimal medical stan-
dards, and adherence to a "specialty standard of conduct" will ensure
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medical responsibility commensurate with the level of training of to-
day's graduating physician.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON SPECIALTY STANDARDS
A. Standard of Care-In General
In an ordinary negligence suit, the defendant's conduct is normally
measured against the conduct of a hypothetical, the reasonably-pru-
dent person acting under the same or similar circumstances.' The
plaintiff must present evidence establishing the applicable standard of
care, demonstrating a breach of that standard, and showing actual
damage in the form of the harm caused by the breach.2 This standard
of care, which evaluates a defendant's conduct against that conduct
which is reasonable under the circumstances, also is applicable in the
law of professional negligence.
The law of ordinary negligence generally does not acknowledge
differing standards or categories of care, but rather it requires adher-
ence to a uniform standard of conduct: that of reasonable care under
the circumstances.3 In medical negligence matters, however, one of the
factors which may be relevant to the determination of what is reason-
able care under the circumstances is the special knowledge or skills
I. The courts have dealt with the standard of conduct by creating a fictitious person,
who never has existed on land or sea: the "reasonable man of ordinary prudence."
Sometimes he is described as a reasonable man, or a prudent man or a man of average
prudence, or a man of ordinary sense using ordinary care and skill. It is evident that all
such phrases are intended to mean very much the same thing. The actor is required to
do what such an ideal individual would be supposed to do in his place. A model of all
proper qualities, with only those human shortcomings and weaknesses which the com-
munity will tolerate on the occasion, "this excellent but odious character stands like a
monument of our Courts of Justice, vainly appealing to his fellow-citizens to order their
lives after his own example."
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 32 at 150 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted).
2. Id. § 30 at 143-44.
§ 281. Statement of the Elements of a Cause of Action for Negligence
The actor is liable for an invasion of an interest of another, ifi
(a) the interest invaded is protected against unintentional invasion, and
(b) the conduct of the actor is negligent with respect to the other, or a class of per-
sons within which he is included, and
(c) the actor's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and
(d) the other has not so conducted himself as to disable himself from bringing an
action for such invasion.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965).
3. The standard of conduct is measured in terms of what is customary in the commuity in
which the conduct occurred. If an actor engages in conduct which every other community mem-
ber has engaged in, the presumption is that he is conforming to the community's standard of
reasonable conduct. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 33 at 166.
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which a defendant physician possesses.4 The duty of reasonable care
requires those with special training and experience to adhere to a stan-
dard of conduct commensurate with such attributes. It is this notion of
specialized knowledge and skill which differentiates the law of profes-
sional negligence from other forms of negligence.5
Although the law has imposed a higher standard of care on doc-
tors, it has tempered the impact of that rule by permitting the profes-
sion, as a group, to set its own legal standards of reasonable conduct.
In an ordinary negligence case, whether a defendant has conformed to
a customary practice is evidence of whether he acted as a reasonably
prudent person.6 In a medical negligence case, however, the question
of whether the defendant acted in conformity with the common prac-
tice within his profession is the essence of the suit. As part of his prima
facie case, a malpractice plaintiff must affirmatively prove that the rele-
vant recognized standards of medical care exercised by other physi-
cians were not followed in the treatment of the plaintiff. In almost all
cases, the plaintiff must present expert witnesses, since the law recog-
nizes the technical complexity of the facts and issues and usually pre-
vents the jury from determining the appropriate standard of care and
whether the defendant's conduct conformed to that standard. Thus, in
most medical cases, there cannot be a finding of negligence without
supporting expert testimony.7
4. See generally, W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 32 at 161-66. "Mhe standard of conduct
becomes one of 'good medical practice,' which is to say, what is customary and usual in the profes-
sion." Id. at 165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289, comment m (1965) provides:
If the actor has in fact more than the minimum of these qualities [i.e., attention, percep-
tion, memory, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment], he is required to exercise the su-
perior qualities that he has in a manner reasonable under the circumstances. The
standard becomes, in other words, that of a reasonable man with such superior attrib-
utes.
Id.
5. For example, an insurance agent is under a duty to exercise such reasonable care and
skill as is expected of an insurance agent acting under similar circumstances. Adkins & Ainley,
Inc. v. Busada, 270 A.2d 135, 137 (D.C. 1970). An optometrist must exercise the degree of skill
expected of an optometrist acting under the same circumstances. See, Evers v. Buxbaum, 253
F.2d 356, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Similarly, a lawyer must exercise that degree of reasonable care,
skill and diligence expected of lawyers acting under similar circumstances. See Wade, TheAuor-
ney's Liabililyfor Negligence, 12 VAND. L. Rv. 755, 762-63 (1959).
6. See notes I and 3 supra and accompanying text.
7. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 32 at 164-65.
The well known reluctance of doctors to testify against one another, which has been
mentioned now and then in the decisions, may make this difficult or impossible to ob-
tain, and so deprive the plaintiff of any remedy for real and grievous wrong. In several
cities, medical and bar associations are now cooperating to meet the problem by setting
up panels of competent and unbiased experts, who will examine the plaintiff, and agree
to testify for him if they find there has been negligence. Where the matter is regarded as
within the common knowledge of laymen, as where the surgeon saws off the wrong leg,
[Vol. 16:720
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B. The Locality Rule
To understand the specialty standard of care, a review of the "lo-
cality rule"8 is necessary. The effect of the locality rule is to suppress
the minimal standard of care required of the medical community.'
The locality rule, which developed prior to accreditation of medi-
cal schools by the American Medical Association's Council of Medical
Education in 1906,1° has undergone erosion and, in a few jurisdictions,
outright rejection." The specialty standard of care in some cases is an
exception to the locality rule, while in other cases, the specialty doctrine
completely eliminates the locality rule.'2
Geographically, the locality rule was first interpreted to limit the
or there is injury to a part of the body not within the operative field, it has been held that
the jury may infer negligence without the aid of any expert.
Id. (foonotes omitted). Expert testimony is not necessary if the doctrine of res #psa loquitur ap-
plies. See Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 1262 (1962).
8. The "locality rule" evolved from a fairness concept. For example, a country physician
lacking advanced equipment and facilities would not be held to the same standard as a physician
at an urban, highly specialized teaching hospital with the latest equipment. Thus, a country physi-
cian would be held to the standard of care of the reasonable country physician of the same locale.
See notes 12-15 infra and accompanying text.
Locality limitation on the standard of care of physicians has never been applied in English
courts. See H. NATHAN, MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE 21 (1957); Fleming, Developments in the English
Law ofMedicalLiability, 12 VAND. L. REV. 633, 640-41 (1959). Numerous articles discussing the
locality rule have appeared in periodicals. See, e.g., Waltz, The Rise and Gradual Fall of the Local-
ity Rule in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 18 DE PAUL L. REV. 408 (1969); Note, Law and
Medicine-Locality and the Standard of Care of the Medical Practioners, 25 ARK. L. REv. 169
(1971); Comment, The Locality Rule in Medical Malpractice Suits, 5 CAL. W.L. REV. 124 (1968);
Note, Negligence-Medical Malpractice-The Localiy Rule, 18 DE PAUL L. REV. 328 (1968);
Note, The Standardof Carefor the Medical Specialist in Ohio: Bruni v. Tatsumi, 38 OHIo ST. L.J.
203 (1977); Comment, Standard of Carefor Medical Specialists, 16 ST. Louis UNIV. L.J. 497
(1972); Comment, Medical Specialties and the Locality Rule, 14 STAN. L. REV. 884 (1962); Com-
ment, An Evaluation ofChanges in the Medical Standard ofCare, 23 VAND. L. REV. 729 (1970).
One of the earliest expressions of the rationale of the locality rule appears in the Kansas case
of Tefft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 33 (1870). There, the court stated:
In the smaller towns and country, those who practice medicine and surgery, though often
possessing a thorough theoretical knowledge of the highest elements of the profession, do
not enjoy so great opportunities of daily observation and practical operations, where the
elementary studies are brought into every-day use, as those who reside in the metropoli-
tan towns; and, though just as well informed in the elements and literature of their pro-
fession, they should not be expected to exercise that high degree of skill and practical
knowledge possessed by those having greater facilities for performing and witnessing
operations, and who are, or may be, constantly observing the various accidents and
forms of disease.
Id at 43.
9. See notes 22-23 infra and accompanying text.
10. See Siirila v. Barrios, 398 Mich. 576, 615-616, 248 N.W.2d 171, 186 (1976).
11. Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370, 372-73 (Ky. 1970); Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency
Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 199, 349 A.2d 245, 252 (1975); Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73,
-431 P.2d 973, 978 (1967); Shier v. Freedman, 58 Wis. 2d 269, - 206 N.W.2d 166, 174 (1973).
12. Kronke v. Danielson, 108 Ariz. 400, 499 P.2d 156 (1972); Morrison v. McNamara, 407
A.2d 555 (D.C. 1979); Christy v. Saliterman, 288 Minn. 144, 179 N.W.2d 288 (1970).
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availability of expert medical witnesses to those physicians who gener-
ally practice in the same community as the defendant physician. The
policy behind this strict locality rule was to prevent the small town
practitioner from being held to the standard of medical practice of the
more sophisticated urban practitioner.13 The courts generally assumed
a rural practitioner had less access to the latest medical information
and facilities than urban doctors and did not have the benefit of the
same breadth of experience. 14 It also was contended that since cities
offered a more lucrative practice, they attracted the most talented doc-
tors.15 Any attempt to hold rural doctors to urban standards would
only drive rural practitioners out of practice, leaving small communi-
ties without any doctors.1 6
Application of the locality rule 17 has always created a number of
practical difficulties. The strict locality rule understandably facilitated
the "conspiracy of silence" atmosphere because of the scarcity of medi-
cal colleagues in the same community willing to testify against a fellow
practitioner.18 A federal judge in Brown v. Keaveny 1 commented in a
dissent that:
The human instinct for self-preservation being what it is,
there is often disclosed in the trial of these cases what has
been referred to as the conspiracy of silence-the refusal on
the part of the members of the profession to testify against
one of their own for fear that one day they, too, may be de-
fendants in a malpractice case.20
Another practical problem resulting from application of the strict
locality rule was the apparent allowance of a local standard of care
below that which was generally found to be acceptable.21 Additionally,
13. See Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 132,35 Am. Rep. 363, 365 (1880); Note, CUiLiabil-
iy of a Physician for Non-wilful Malpractice, 29 COLUM. L. REv. 985, 987 (1929); Note, The Stan-
dard of Skill and Care Governing the Civil Liability of Physicians, 78 U. PA. L. REv. 91, 96-97
(1929) [hereinafter cited as Standard of Skill].
14. See Waltz, The Rise and Gradual Fall of the Locality Rule in Medical Malpractice Litga-
tion, 18 DE PAUL L. REv. 408, 411 (1969); Standard ofSkill, supra note 13, at 96-97 and n. 35.
15. Burk v. Foster, 114 Ky. 29, 30, 69 S.W. 1096, 1097 (1902).
16. See Standard of Skill, supra note 13, at 97.
17. Even as the courts applied the locality rule, it did not go unrecognized that the increasing
standardization of medical training significantly undermined the application of geographic limita-
tions to the population from which a qualified expert witness could be drawn to testify as to the
required standard of care. See Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal.2d 749, 767, 205 P.2d 3, 13 (1949) (Carter, J.,
dissenting); Montgomery v. Stary, 84 So. 2d 34, 39-40 (Fla. 1955).
18. See note 7 supra.
19. 326 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
20. Id. at 661 (Wright, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
21. The absurdity of coupling the standard of care with the doctor's community is aptly illMus-
[Vol. 16:720
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it was soon recognized that strict adherence to the same locality re-
quirement could completely immunize doctors who were the only prac-
titioners in a small community, as well as small groups of local
physicians whose generally lax practice fell below that ordinarily prac-
ticed in the rural area.22 Proclaiming the sensible ideal, it has been
held that "[niegligence cannot be excused on the ground that others in
the same locality practice the same kind of negligence. 23
The strict locality rule, rather than encouraging medical practi-
tioners to elevate the quality of care and treatment to the level existing
in other communities, may have fostered substandard care by limiting
the testing of the conduct of medical professionals to the conduct of
other medical professionals in the same medical community.24 More-
over, medical schools generally do not provide different degrees of in-
structions dependent upon where one intends to practice.
At the turn of the century, the logic behind the strict locality rule
was evident when distances were great and the traveling country doctor
had to contend with muddy lanes, swollen streams and impassable
mountains; when communication was restricted to handwritten letters;
and when medical journals were rare and largely concerned physicians'
personalities.25 The locality rule was conceived when medical school
curricula were much less standardized. Medical education then con-
sisted of a course of lectures over a period of six months.26 This formal
education was supplemented by preceptor-apprenticeships with prac-
trated in Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968), in which the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts overruled its earlier decision in Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 35 Am.
Rep. 363 (1880), containing one of the first enunciations of the similar locality rule. In Brune,
which involved an act of alleged malpractice in the city of New Bedford, slightly more than 50
miles from Boston, the trial judge had instructed the jury:
If, in a given case, it were determined by a jury that the ability and skill of the physician
in New Bedford were fifty percent inferior to that which existed in Boston, a defendant
in New Bedford would be required to measure up to the standard of skill and compe-
tence and ability that is ordinarily found by physicians in New Bedford.
354 Mass. at -, 235 N.E.2d at 795.
22. See Gramm v. Boener, 56 Ind. 497 (1877), quoted in Burk v. Foster, 114 Ky. 25, -, 69
S.W. 1096, 1097 (1902).
23. Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 78, 431 P.2d 973, 977 (1967).
24. Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555, 563 (D.C. 1979).
25. See Grist v. French, 136 Cal. App. 2d 247-, 288 P.2d 1003, 1017 (1955). The Supreme
Court of Florida stated:
[The locality rule] was originally formulated when communications were slow or virtu-
ally non-existent, and.. . it has lost much of its significance today with the increasing
number and excellence of medical schools, the free interchange of scientific information,
and the consequent tendency to harmonize medical standards throughout the country.
Montgomery v. Stary, 84 So.2d 34, 39-40 (Fla. 1955).
26. See Note, An Evaluation of Changes in the Medical Standard of Care, 23 VAND. L. Rav.
729, 732-33 n.16 (1970).
1981]
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ticing physicians who had acquired even less formal education.27
C. Same or Similar Communities
The rigidity of the strict locality rule was not relaxed to reflect the
technological progress of medicine until the expansion of the geograph-
ical reference group. With this expansion, "same or similar communi-
ties"'28 became the term of art defining the relevant geographic
standard of care. Similarity of communities, however, should not de-
pend on population, but rather on the similarity of medical facilities,
practices and advantages.2 9 The existence of research and laboratory
facilities in the communities and the availability of other medical re-
sources to serve the physician have a significant bearing on the appro-
priate standards of practice.
Many courts have criticized this "same or similar communities"
approach in defining who is competent to testify as an expert. 30 Diffi-
culty arises when a court must determine whether two communities are
similar. The similar communities rule answers some of the criticisms
directed at the strict locality standard by expanding the geographical
area in which the expert witness may testify as to a medical opinion.
The similar community standard, however, is not sufficient when the
requisite standard of care is geographically determined. A minimal
standard of care may be similarly minimal in a similar community.
"Substandard practice is substandard whether it is followed in the same
or in a similar community."3
Even the most liberal application of the "similar community" rule
implies that some characteristics of a geographic area justify a different
and perhaps lower standard of care in the exercise of medical judgment
than the standard followed in other localities. 32 In nineteenth century
27. Id.
28. For cases applying the "similar communities" test, see Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 420 (1971).
See also McCoid, The Care Required ofledicalPractitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549 (1959); Note,
Medical Specialties and the Locality Rule, 14 STAN. L. REV. 884 (1962). For a discussion of the
phrase "or similar communities" stated in the general rule in malpractice cases, see Yeates v.
Harms, 193 Kan. 320, 393 P.2d 982 (1964); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093,
claified, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
29. See Gambill v. Stroud, 258 Ark. 766, - 531 S.W.2d 945, 948 (1976),followed, White v.
Mitchell, 263 Ark. 787, 568 S.W.2d 216 (1978).
30. See generally, Note, Torts-Medical Malpractice-Michigan Abandons "Locality Rule"
With Regard to Specialists, 40 FoRDHAm L. Rnv. 435, 439 (1971); Note, Medical Malpractice-
Expert Testimony, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 834, 838 (1966); Note, Medical Specialties and the Locality
Rule, 14 STAN. L. REv. 884, 890 (1962).
31. Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555, 565 (D.C. 1979).
32. See Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d 123, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
[Vol. 16:720
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America, the validity of this assumption may have been obvious
enough for courts to accept unquestionably.33
The assumption of its continuing validity in our age of ubiquitous
national communication networks, both within and outside the medical
profession, is extremely doubtful.3 4 "Modem medical education and
postgraduate training [have] been nationalized. Scientific information
flows freely among medical institutions throughout the country. Pro-
fessional journals and numerous other means of continuing education
are national in scope. ' '35 All licensed physicians meet minimum stan-
dards required by all state licensing boards.36 The increasing excel-
lence of medical schools and the free interchange of scientific
information tend to harmonize medical standards throughout the coun-
try.3 7 The current trend toward uniform and improved levels of medi-
cal practice will inevitably result from encouraging continuing medical
education,3  as well as "the prevalence of regional medical centers,
standardization and excellence of modem medical schools and train-




36. Each state's licensing system, on behalf of the public, is dependent on the schools of
medicine and teaching hospitals to provide the educational experience that will foster the develop-
ment of the knowledge, abilities and skills required for the practice of medicine. The medical
schools and hospitals, in turn, rely on the state medical boards to evaluate the capabilities of their
graduates to assume responsibility for the care of patients. 303 Naw ENGLAND J. MED. 1357
(1980).
37. Cook v. Lichtblau, 144 So. 2d 312, 315 (Fla. 1962), quoting Montgomery v. Stary, 84
So.2d 34, 39 (Fla. 1955).
38. Continuing medical education is one way which physicians may remain abreast of the
advances of medicine. An early reference to continuing medical education is found in a report by
the Commission on Medical Education of the American Association of Medical Colleges, where it
stated:
In discussing the problems of an adequate program of medical care for a community and
in visualizing the individual medical needs to be met, emphasis was placed upon the
necessity of competent physicians who are familiar with current knowledge regarding the
diagnosis, treatment and prevention of disease, and upon the importance of every physi-
cian continuing to be a student through his professional life. * The time may come
when every physician may be required, in the public interest, to take continuation
courses to insure that his practice will be kept abreast of current methods of diagnosis,
treatment and prevention. Postgraduate Medical Education, Final Report of the Com-
mission on Medical Education, American Association of Medical Colleges, 122-40
(1932)
As of June 1, 1978, the following states had enacted legislation or created regula-
tions providing for a Commission on Medical Education (CME) requirement for re-
registration of the license to practice medicine: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Puerto
Rico, Rhode Island, Utah, Washington and Wisconsin. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-
2809 at 220 (1980).
8
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devices." 39 Medical textbooks in use today are national textbooks. The
required examination is a national exam, evaluated by a body of exam-
iners selected to eliminate regional peculiarities. After certification,4
specialists4' keep abreast of developments in their field through medi-
39. Siirila v. Barrios, 398 Mich. 576, -, 248 N.W.2d 171, 187 (1976).
40. The recognition of the need for continuing medical education is perhaps best exhibited
by the medical community through certification of specialists. Certification of specialists, such as
the licensing of a physician, requires the ability to exhibit necessary expertise and experience at
the time of testing. The maintenance of the necessary expertise and experience, however, requires
continuous medical education which can only be tested by periodic recertification examinations.
Recognition of the need for recertification was reported by the Advisory Board for Medical Spe-
cialists. The report stated "many persons argue that certification of a specialist indicates that he is
up to date and competent at the time of examination, but this does not prove that he continues
indefinitely thereafter to be competent and aware of all important new knowledge in his field."
Specialty Boards, Report of the Commission on Graduate Medical Education, Evanston, Ill., Ad-
visory Board of Medical Specialties, 203-23 (1940).
Periodic recertification is intended to have the physician specialist maintain the current
knowledge and capabilities as the science and technology of medicine advances. Periodic recer-
tification of physicians dictates continuing education as a categorical imperative of contemporary
medicine. A National Program to Conquer Heart Disease, Cancer, and Stroke; Report to the Presi.
dent, President's Commission on Heart Disease, Cancer and Stroke (1964). The acceptance of this
philosophy was evident by 1978 when 19 specialty boards had established commitments to recer-
tification. "Why Certnfcation?" 115 ARCHIVES OF SURGERY 11-14 (1980). Periodic recertification
is a significant mechanism within the profession insuring the maintenance of a high level of pro-
fessional competence.
41. For a comprehensive compilation of requirements for certification, statistics on numbers
of specialists, names and addresses of the various specialty boards, names and addresses of hospi-
tals with approved residency training programs for the various specialties, and other details per-
taining to postgraduate medical education, consult the issue of the Journal oftheAmerican Medical
Association which contains each year's annual report of the Council on Medical Education and
Hospitals. The Directory of MedicalSpecialists gives biographical information on physicians certi-
fied by the various specialty boards.
Certification requirements are as follows: Dermatology--the American Board of Dermatol-
ogy requires three years' training beyond internship; Internal Medicine-the American Board of
Internal Medicine requires three years' training beyond internship when a formal residency pro-
gram is followed, but several alternate plans are offered; Neurology-the American Board of Psy-
chiatry and Neurology requires three years' training beyond internship; Pathology-the American
Board of Pathology requires four years' training beyond internship; Pediatrics-the American
Board of Pediatrics requires two years' training beyond internship and two additional years' train-
ing for certification in the subspecialty of pediatric allergy; Physical Medicine andRehabilitatlon-
the American Board of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation requires three years' training be-
yond internship; Preventive Medicine--the American Board of Preventive Medicine requires three
years' training beyond internship for public health, four years' training beyond internship for
aviation medicine, and three years' training beyond internship for occupational medicine; Psychla-
try-the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology requires three years' training beyond in-
ternship; Radiology-the American Board of Radiology requires three years' training beyond
internship for the categories of radiology (that branch of medicine which deals with the diagnostic
and therapeutic application of radiant energy including roentgen, i.e. x-rays, radium and radioiso-
topes), diagnosticroentgenology (that branch of radiology which deals with the therapeutic appli-
cation of roentgen rays, radium and radioactive isotopes);Anesthesiology-the American Board of
Anesthesiology requires a minimum of two years' training beyond intership; GeneralSurgery-the
American Board of Surgery requires a minimum of three years' training beyond internship; Neu-
rological Surgery-the American Board of Neurological Surgery requires a minimum of four
years' training beyond internship; Obstetrics and Gynecology-the American Board of Obstetrics
9
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cal specialty journals42 disseminated throughout the nation, and
through meetings of medical specialty societies with national and inter-
national memberships.
It is evident the medical profession has adopted a national stan-
dard for membership in most of its certified specialties. 43 Geographic
conditions or circumstances, therefore, should neither control the stan-
dard of a specialist's care nor the admissibility of an expert's testimony.
If the law with regard to medical specialists remains tied to a locality or
community standard, it ignores the realities of modern medicine in
favor of a medical philosophy that served us poorly fifty and one hun-
dred years ago.'
and Gynecology requires three years' training beyond internship; Ophthalmology-the American
Board of Ophthalmology requires three years' training beyond internship; Orthopedic Surgery-
the American Board of Orthopaedic Surgery requires four years' training beyond internship; O'o-
laryngology-the American Board of Otolaryngology requires three years' training beyond intern-
ship, or four years' training beyond internship if certification includes eye diseases; Proctology-
the American Board of Proctology requires five years' training beyond internship (three years in
general surgery, plus two years in proctology); Thoracic Surgery--the Board of Thoracic Surgery
(an affiliate of the American Board of Surgery) requires certification by the American Board of
Surgery plus two years' additional training in thoracic surgery; Urology-the American Board of
Urology requires four years' training beyond internship.
42. Some of the leading journals in each specialty field are: Dermatology-ARCHIvEs OF
DERMATOLOGY; Internal Medicine-ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE; ANNALS OF INTERNAL
MEDICINE, MEDICAL CLINICS OF NORTH AMERICA; Neurology-ARCHIVES OF NEUROLOGY AND
PSYCHIATRY; JOURNAL OF NERVOUS AND MENTAL DISEASES; NEUROLOGY; Pathology-
ARCHIVES OF PATHOL6oY; AMERICAN JOURNAL OF CLINICAL PATHOLOGY; Pediatrics-JOURNAL
OF DISEASES OF CHILDREN; JOURNAL OF PEDIATRICS; PEDIATRICS; PEDIATRIC CLINICS OF
NORTH AMERICA; Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation-AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHYSICAL
MEDICINE; JOURNAL OF REHABILITATION; Preventive Medicine-ARCHIVES OF INDUSTRIALHEALTH; AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH; Psychiatry-ARcHiVES OF NEUROLOGY AND
PSYCHIATRY; AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHIATRY; PSYCHIATRY; PSYCHIATRIC QUARTERLY; RA-
DIUM THERAPY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE; RADIOLOGY; Anesthesiology-ANESTHESIOLOGY; Gen-
eral Surgery-ARCHIVES OF SURGERY; AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SURGERY; ANNALS OF SURGERY;
SURGERY; SURGERY, GYNECOLOGY AND OBSTETRICS; SURGICAL CLINICS OF NORTH AMERICA;
Neurological Surgery-JOURNAL OF NEUROSURGERY; Obstetrics and Gynecology-AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY; OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY; SURGERY, GYNE-
COLOGY AND OBSTETRICS; Ophthalmology-ARcHIvEs OF OPHTHALMOLOGY; AMERICAN JOUR-
NAL OF OPHTHALMOLOGY; Orthopedic Surgery-JoURNAL OF BONE AND JOINT SURGERY;
Otolaryngology-ARCHIVES OF OTOLARYNGOLOGY; ANNALS OF OTOLOGY, RHINOLOGY AND
LARYNGOLOGY; Plastic Surgery-PLASTIC AND RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY; Proctology--see
journals in general surgery, Thoracic Surgery-JouRNAL OF THORACIC SURGERY; Urology-
Journal of Urology.
43. In 1962, the Board of Editors of the STAN. L. REV. conducted a survey of the American
Specialty Boards, the American Medical Association, the American Hospital Association, and
publishers of medical specialty journals and medical specialty societies to determine the similarity
of practice throughout the country within each recognized medical specialty. The results indi-
cated that the practice within most specialties was similar nationwide. See Note, Medical Special-
ties and the Locality Rule, 14 STAN. L. REV. 884, 887-89 & nn.17-23 (1962).
44. Louisell and Williams commented in this regard that:
The comprehensive coverage of the Journal of the American Medical Association, the
availability of numerous other journals, the ubiquitous "detail men" of the drug compa-
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III. AN EMERGING NATIONAL STANDARD OF CARE
Medical standards solely dictated by geographic considerations
have evidenced erosion through the courts' recognition of the increas-
ing emphasis on medical specialization. Concomitantly, the emergence
of a national standard of medicine has enabled the requisite standard
of care to mirror the practice of modem medicine. Labeled the "spe-
cialty standard of care" by most courts, the national standard is45 based
upon professional proficiency rather than geographic proximity. As
such, it establishes a medical-legal principle consistent with the realities
of contemporary medical knowledge and practice.
In theory, the national uniform standard of medicine may be diffi-
cult for some commentators, including jurists, to accept. In reality,
however, most aspects of the practice of medicine are, or should be, so
universally known and followed that they are accepted as standards
throughout the profession regardless of whether the physician is lo-
cated in a metropolitan area or a rural area. Therefore, the conflict
between national and local standards is largely illusory. Although dif-
ferent treatment methods may be expressed by various medical experts
who testify, very seldom will those methods be geographically oriented.
Few medical malpractice cases are pursued and even fewer are success-
fully concluded when the absence of specialized medical facilities or
techniques is at issue and when the general methods of diagnosis and
treatment of the injury in question would be different in a rural com-
munity than in a large metropolitan center. As an example, "the stan-
dard of care [practiced by] any [physician] or surgeon in the inspection
and detection of post-surgical wound infections cannot, on any rational
basis, vary from one part of the country to another."46
A "cry of wolf" may be heard from voices in the medical commu-
nity regarding the imposition of national standards on small town gen-
nies, closed circuit television presentations of medical subjects, special radio networks for
physicians, tape recorded digests of medical literature, and hundreds of widely available
postgraduate courses all serve to keep physicians informed and increasingly to establish
nationwide standards. Medicine realizes this, so it is likely that the law will do likewise.
D. LOUISELL and H. WILLIAMS, THE PAENCHYMA OF LAW 182 183 (1960).
The Michigan Supreme Court states:
The reliance of the public upon the skills of a specialist and the wealth and sources of his
knowledge are not limited to the geographic area in which he practices. Rather his
knowledge is a specialty. He specializes so that he may keep abreast. Any fnon-na-
tional] standard for a specialist would negate the fundamental expectations and purpose
of a specialty.
Naccarato v. Grob, 384 Mich. 248, -, 180 N.W.2d 788, 791 (1970).
45. Hirschberg v. New York, 91 Misc. 2d 590, -, 398 N.Y.S.2d 470, 475 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
46. Priest v. Lindig, 583 P.2d 173, 179 (Alaska, 1978).
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eral practitioners. The argument may be heard that national standards
of medicine require small town general practitioners to perform triple
cardiac bypass surgeries in order to conform to the standard reflected in
the major metropolitan cardiovascular surgical centers in the nation.
The fallacy, however, with this reasoning is the elemental medical phi-
losophy instilled in the minds of medical students during medical
school: physicians should refer the patient when they know or should
know they are not in a position to administer successfully the needed
treatment and that a better medical facility is available.47 Thus, the
small town general practitioner may have a duty not to operate, but
rather to refer.
In adopting the national standard of care, the particular circum-
stances of the community where the physician practices may be rele-
vant. The availability of certain medical facilities, the accessibility of
professional consultation, and the communication and transportation
systems of the area should be factors for the jury to consider. Obvi-
ously, a physician cannot depart from standard medical practices for
failing to employ medical equipment that is not available, when there is
no time to procure such equipment from another community, nor time
to refer the patient. Medicine is the art of the possible, and each physi-
cian owes the duty to care optimally and treat by making the best re-
sources available even if he referred the patient elsewhere. The
specialty standard may be inapplicable if the patient fully understands
that a specialist is available, but opts against referral to that specialist.
The adoption of a national standard of care and the availability of the
skills of a specialist should increase the number of patient referrals.
But whenever a physician refers a patient, the physician runs the risk
that the patient may never return for aftercare or subsequent unrelated
care. Increased referrals are incompatible with the practice of retaining
patients whose problems the physician is marginally competent to deal
with. It is the patient who benefits from the adherence to this greater
degree of care.
The national standard of care has been applied throughout the
country in a non-uniform manner.48 Several courts have followed the
47. Swan v. Lamb, 584 P.2d 814, 817 (Utah, 1978).
48. Even where the courts have not repudiated the similar communities test in so many
words, they have tended to change the definition of "similarity" to one which increases the focus
on medical variables which might impinge upon the defendant physicians' capacity to provide
services. Descriptions of this trend, and of the increased standardization of training and access to
medical facilities, can be found in Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d 123, 128-29 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n., 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245 (1975).
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lead of the medical profession and have established a national standard
of care for all physicians, completely abandoning any locality limita-
tions.49 Other courts limit the application of the national standard to
specialists.50 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has
further restricted national specialty standards to board certified special-
ists.5 ' The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Brune v. Be-
l rnkof2 articulated the national standard as the "average member of
the professional practising the specialty." 3 Similarly, the Supreme
Court of Washington in Pederson v. Dumouchel,4 framed its standard
in terms of "an average, competent practitioner,"' ' and the Maryland
Court of Appeals in Shillcret v. Annapolis Emergency HosplitalAssnI6 as
the "reasonably competent practitioner in the same class in which he
belongs ...."I'
Perhaps there is no substantive difference in the verbal distinction
between average and reasonably competent medical practitioner. Those
courts which use the word "average" may well intend it in the sense of
"ordinary" or "commonly possessed." The term "average," however,
can have other meanings which should not be incorporated into a stan-
dard of care for negligence. It could be taken to refer to an "aggrega-
tion of the best and the worst, the experienced and the
inexperienced."5 " "Half of the physicians of America do not automati-
cally become negligent. . . because their skill is less than the profes-
sional average." 9 To the extent the two formulations of the standard
differ, "reasonably competent" should be preferred because of the po-
tential misinterpretation of the term "average."
What constitutes a specialist is significant if a medical specialist is
49. Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370, 372-73 (Ky. 1970); Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency
Hosp. Ass'n., 276 Md. 187, 199, 349 A.2d 245, 252 (1975); Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d
73, -, 431 P.2d 973, 978 (1967); Shier v. Freedman, 58 Wash.2d 269, -, 206 N.W.2d 166, 174
(1973).
50. E.g., Kronke v. Danielson, 108 Ariz. 400, 499 P.2d 156 (1972),fallowed, Matson v.
Naifeh, 122 Ariz. 360, 595 P.2d 38 (1979).
51. See Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555 (D.C. 1979).
52. 235 N.E.2d 793 (Mass. 1968).
53. Id. at 798.
54. 72 Wash.2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967).
55. Id. Similar or identical rules have been adopted in at least the following cases: Landeros
v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 392-93 (1976), 131 Cal. Rptr. 69, 72-73; Blair v. Eblen, 461
S.W.2d 370, 373 (Ky. 1970).
56. 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245 (1975).
57. Id. at - , 349 A.2d at 253.
58. See Waltz, The Rise and Gradual Fall of the Locality Rule in Medical Malpractice Litiga-
tion, 18 DE PAUL L. REv. 408, 409 n.l (1969).
59. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 299A, comment e (1965).
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held to a national standard. A physician may become a specialist on
the basis of education and certification." A physician also is consid-
ered a specialist if he holds himself out as such, as is one "who confines
his practice to specific diseases or disabilities. 61 Since the public
rarely knows the extent of the physician's education and any specialty
certification, the patient's perspective of the physician's capabilities
should be relevant. Regardless of the degree of education of a special-
ist and any specialty certification, if a physician undertakes care and
treatment that falls within the purview of a specialist, the law should
judge the care and treatment based upon a specialty standard of care.62
IV. CONCLUSION
While the law is slow to change, medical progress is rapid and
accelerating. It is no longer conscionable to allow small town physi-
cians to continue substandard practices because of archaic "locality"
legal concepts dating from the horse-and-buggy era. Physicians of lim-
ited training should not be insulated from medical misadventures that
could be avoided through consultation and referral. The economic ap-
prehensions and the personal needs of the physician cannot excuse a
breach of the duty to refer. "Every-doctor-would-have-to-be-a-brain-
surgeon" is, in reality, a smokescreen. A national standard of care is
the medical-legal counterpart to national sources of readily available
training for both medical students and established practitioners.
Tort law is the mechanism by which society reconciles conflict.
We must expect the body of tort law to evolve in the direction of en-
forcing greater medical responsibility if today's physicians are to have
responsibility commensurate with their opportunity to practice accepta-
ble medicine. Medical tort law, although it deals with unfortunate con-
sequences, has the net effect in our complex legal system of ensuring
minimal medical standards for the benefit of the patient.
60. Roberts v. Tardif, 417 A.2d 444, 452 (Me. 1980).
61. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1199 (3d ed. 1969).
62. The specialty standard of care is recognized by the following states: Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia. See
Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 953, 954-55 (1968 & Supp. 1980).
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